You know, if there was a hypnotic drug such that I could be sure I'd remember nothing (and many, many similar caveats), I'd volunteer to be caused all kinds of pain, because I don't see why I should care. The only moral angle I can see is the question of who would want it and why. Research maybe? In of itself, it doesn't seem bad.
You’re showing a lack of empathy for the instance of yourself that is experiencing all that pain. Simply forgetting it doesn’t make it right to not have empathy for the version of yourself that went through all the pain and suffering.
Yes, I am! Why isn't that fine? Not "right", you say.
Bear in mind that the "version of me" is me, and cognitively is in agreement that this is fine. Instinctively I would very much not think it was fine while undergoing the pain, but I'd also think I was wrong about that at the same time. I don't suppose I'd be all stoic about it like Giles Corey*, but it's the cognitive side of me that has the valid opinion and eventually the executive function.
No, there's a difference, in that my clone would get PTSD or some similar trauma as a result, which is a waste of a large part of that clone's life. In the version where I'm drugged into forgetfulness, I've only wasted a day, for science and profit.
PTSD and other results of trauma do not require a memory of the thing happening to you. In fact often people don't remember the thing that caused the trauma.
It's enough that your nervous system adapts to the unsafe environment. It doesn't have to know why.
Version 1: A mad scientist swaps your mind with another person's (Linda's), then asks which resulting body he should torture. Intuition says spare the one with your personality, so personality looks like the key to identity.
Version 2: He's going to torture you, but first gives you amnesia, then makes you believe you're Linda, then gives Linda your memories. Intuition says don't torture your body, so the body looks like the key.
Premised on being utterly selfish and not caring about Linda.
Leaving that aside, is this really a great and clever question? In version 2, your minds are swapped, so it's the same question. The difference is that you have been "driven crazy" and "deluded", but in what sense? If the objective is to avoid yourself being tortured, it's unclear which one is yourself, simply because the question relies on the unclear fictional process of "making you believe you're the other person", and the question itself implies you shouldn't trust that process.
It could be made shorter: "A mad scientist comes along and does something mysterious, so that you might not be yourself any more! So, are you? Ah, you don't know! Gotcha!"
The original is in Problems of the Self, 1973. (Or it's an essay titled The Self and The Future.) I've got hold of that, am reading. The original version is really long.
The first six pages are just really making a meal out of describing all the ramifications of the simple sci-fi concept of a body swap.
Yes, unfortunately it seems to be not very good. "He now further adds that at the moment of torture I shall not only not remember the things I am now in a position to remember, but will have a different set of impressions of my past, quite different from the memories I now have. I do not think that this would cheer me up, either." So, the problem with this is that it's nonsense, like saying "You are not you, but you are! Now if something happens to that person, does it happen to you?" Well I don't know, Bernard, it depends what your rather silly words mean. He's just playing the shell game with the word I.
Then at the end (ten pages later) there's a messier version: "he could have gone on and produced two persons each with A-like character and memories, as well as one or two with B-like characteristics". So it seems that the confusion and non-neatness of the swap is the whole point. Thing is, I'm not even very concerned which one is me. I suppose, alright, I do prefer me-like characteristics. So I'll take the half-dozen clones who seem vaguely right, that's good enough for me. Whatever.
Babies, the comatose, people currently asleep ... this one is something about universal human rights, a protection against anybody appointing themselves judge and trying to micromanage who is or isn't an equal, which only causes trouble.
Why do you put baby brain activity next inactive coma or sleep?
It sounds like, "Rocks, sand, turtles: these don't experience $things." I don't see why babies belong in your list as much as turtles don't belong in mine.
Well that would depend exactly what we're talking about. "Cognitive capabilities", wasn't it? Maybe exclude babies but include drunks, if you like. I don't know who really belongs on the list, which is kind of the point.
Category error started at "we should not treat humans with impaired cognitive abilities as equals".
Yes, there's a good chance that whatever combination of metrics gets accepted to draw the consciousness/moral weight boundary in the future, it'll have some overlaps like in that infamous quip about "smartest bears" and "dumbest tourists". Applied to a spot measurement, it'll likely put some subset of people - drunk, cognitively impaired, sleeping, children under N months, etc. - below the "conscious/sentient" threshold, and below some animals.
Which is why such criteria only make sense at population lifetime level, not individual level. That's both aggregate and temporal ranges. Temporal, because children grow up, drunk people sober, impaired people may get better and may have been better in the past. Aggregate, because once you go down to individual level, you invite most horrible crimes ever committed.
A baby's brain is in super-sponge mode. They lack experience and control. Just because they don't yet speak doesn't mean they would not have something to say.
That a drunk person shouldn't make critical decisions and nor should a toddler is different than equating a baby's experience to someone asleep or in a coma.
My 2yo had memories from over a year prior. She would bring up things that surprised us. She later forgot that stuff, but she always had a larger window of experience to pull from than we expected.
Treating kids like coma patients ignores that experience and window of memories. You bet your ass you could traumatize / condition a baby to fear. You cant do that to someone in a coma. I doubt you can condition someone purely in their sleep too fwiw.
We should assume a rich experience until proven otherwise.
I 100% agree. My point is that approximately all humans will go through these phases/episodes, and spend some small fraction of their lives below "conscious/sentient/sapient" threshold of whatever metric one could propose - and we should not classify individuals by where they happen to be on that scale at the current point in time.
(In contrast, every bacteria and every amoeba will clock below threshold of any reasonable metric 100% of the time.)
Expand this to 1-minute before birth, 1-month, 4-months, keep going. Fetal brain development is mature enough by 6 weeks that reflex and movement start.
As a non-native speaker, you have to sound it out. It's a pun of "can't have your cake and eat it".
HN has been overrun with puns and attempts at humour in the past few years, while substantive comments have declined imho. But that's just the way it is.
Ha, OK. The darts seem designed to separate from the fletched part of the shaft, like a two-stage rocket, so the pun sounded confusingly truthful, as in they're not quite hafted.
Something similar happened to Angband, when I went back to it recently it had been given an overhaul that included making the game shorter. So I went back to v3.4.1.
One of the important overlooked aspects of this is how maltreatment of something that appears to be human-like in many ways by an actual human affects the person doing it.
I know this did not end up being applicable in the video game world (which I'm continually glad for). With LLMs, it feels more likely it would be.
We’ve had 30 years of people killing digital people, often controlled by actual people without any obvious impact on violent tendencies.
I’m concerned about campaigns by misguided people to “protect” the bots. Seeing the response to the Unitree bots on AGT and their behavior’s effect on my own emotional response, I wonder how far off we are from calls for robot rights. We are more than tool-using apes, but for those that think that’s all we are, what’s the difference between that and tool using bots that emote, mimic distress, and otherwise act autonomously.
On a personal meatbag level emotions are magical and something ineffable.
From a scientific stance, chemical make brain go happy or sad and there's nothing special or magical about that. Every emotion we feel is because it was evolutionarily valuable for us to do so.
That's a very closed definition of grieving. So by your definition a future perfectly simulated human brain cannot grieve because no chemicals are involved?
Whether anything a perfectly simulated human brain (or other organism see the fruit fly simulated brain) does is actually real - in the same sense it’s real for you and me - is still up for debate i think.
Assuming it’s possible to perfectly simulate a human brain
They can pretend to, of course, and use the language of grief, but if you can't feel the cold bottomless pit that has bored through your gut then you aren't really grieving.
Do books grieve? I ascribe the same kind of interaction to llm's. They work on a different substrate than us and their perception of reality, if there is any, will be wholly different than our perception because of the constraints of the substrate itself.
Not to mention the lack of continuity of existence kind of precludes any deeper and more meaningful interactions with the self.
I am not saying that they are unable to feel, but at the current structure and ephemeral existance they are unable to do so, they lack the minimum prerequisites.
> I hope that’s just because you haven’t had a reason to grieve… Either way, hope you are well!
Thanks, stranger.
I'm old enough that I have experienced significant grief a few times in my life.
Given our mortality, we should welcome some degree of situational grief, as grief is the absence of a previous love that we were lucky enough to experience in the first place.
Of course, there are also profoundly unfair versions of grief (like the loss of a child) that I wish nobody (or no whale, for that matter) would ever have to experience.
You could have an alternative explanation: large animals invest lots of food energy in their offspring, and so the slimmest chance that a calf might not be dead is worth lots of effort. Say one in a thousand actually revive.
It seems that an orca invests so much in a son that it's like an all-or-nothing one way ticket to pass her genes on. (She might get second try later, but the probability is much lower.)
You might also argue that although there may be a non-emotional argument for why grieving could be beneficial, it’s possible or even likely that evolution encoded this instinct in something like emotions. Just how evolution encoded the tendency to care for one’s family and community in emotions for humans.
Yes! Which leads into strange territory, because we can say that attachment is not entirely rational, but is influenced by genes pointing us toward more successful reproduction, without concern for creating knowledge. But then this environment of instincts is the environment we've built up all our cultural store of meaning in, it's the human condition, so the argument can be turned around to say that meaning isn't entirely rational. So even gene-driven attachment isn't meaningless, but at the same time, I don't want to be bullied and herded around emotionally by little nucleic acid spirals just so they can replicate themselves.
Indeed. The same goes for widows at funerals. I mean, has anyone ever dissected the brain of a grieving human and said “aha hah! Here it is!! The grief!”
That's logical, yes. If person A wants to read a summary (even a generated one) outlining the state of modern space dinosaur research, or whatever, and person B also wants the exact same thing, then person B should be happy to read the summary that person A prompted.
The same is true if the thing they both want is a stale cupcake bought from a gas station. But this still doesn't mean that person B wants to be presented with person A's stale thing, because the overhead of the social transaction isn't worth the object. Which is to say, it makes a terrible gift.
The key difference is that while an encyclopedia holds facts themselves, LLMs trained on that source material encode something more like a highly probable facsimile of those facts - the original fact was lost, LLMs are lossy, but can often be generated again with a decent level of accuracy by churning through stats about words, concepts, and relationships between them.
The whole catch is that they can often be regenerated. But LLMs (on their own, in their parametric memory - which is the result of training) don't have any conception of whether what they've generated is a real reproduction of some training material or whether they've invented something false that seemed probable based on their encoded stats. When the probability produces something contrary to what was in the training material, you get hallucinations.
They're very, very good predictive text models and can be very, very powerful when hooked up to other tools or outside databases. But its fundamentally lossy technology and all the books having been fed in doesn't guarantee all of the knowledge from those books can be spat back out.
Humans can learn texts by heart, even lots of text (I have some expertise on that, having studied opera singing). They can reproduce these texts accurately, deterministically and repeatably. An LLM is a statistical machine. It does not know any text by heart and it is by pure chance that it sometimes reproduces existing texts verbatim.
Break it into small chunks and practice. Practice more. Put the chunks together and practice even more. Like any skill, it isn't something people are magically good at beyond minor proficiency.
Every performance- singing a song, playing an instrument, performing a stand-up routine, giving a speech, performing a theatrical role are all things that are best done from memory but require practice.
There are pneumonic tricks you can use- I've seen some people do it for tricks like memorizing the order of a deck of cards- but it's less useful for long term recital because it helps with order but not comprehension or fast indexing.
Humans sometimes don't remember things 100%. LLMs can produce certain text and be run deterministically.
I don't really understand this side of the debate other than as a gotcha tbh.
If LLM use atrophies your brain and skills that's bad. If it has a repulsive writing style that's bad.
I'm not sure what the debate about whether an AI is a statistical parrot unlike humans accomplishes. Is relying 100% on a bad human speechwriter somehow better?
It comes up frequently when discussing whether LLMs actually have intelligence or qualify as AI, especially in discussions on the path to achieving AGI.
The primary complaint seems to be that LLMs are held to a higher standard than humans, though I don't particularly buy that line of reasoning.
It's funny. I always thought that writing was meant to inform, persuade, or entertain about the subject at hand.
But in professional settings, a lot more of the informativeness is about the author, and a lot more of the persuasiveness is I'm worth your time and money. So, if the author is an LLM, and obviously so, what exactly are you informing your audience of (about yourself), and what are you persuading them to do (with your article).
People using LLMs not in a gruntwork manner tend to confuse style and tone with facts and knowledge.
LLMs are great to make drafts if you give them the source materials. They're great at validation if you give them the tools. They are great at layouting if you give them linters.
Encode architecture and decisions in your workflow, then proofread what your agents have been working on. Not the other way around.
Better validation and testing means more work will transform from exhaustive decision work to automateable gruntwork.
But of course with the gen-AI stuff you are getting put in touch with the real ideas of real artists (e.g. Miyazaki), it's just that they've been anonymized and put through a blender.
I think there are lots of people who value art for the ideas of the artist. There are also lots of people who think that they value something like quality of brushstrokes, and these are the same people, mostly. I mean they don't know what they like it for, but the raw graphical data is what's in front of them, so they ascribe their preference to its (supposedly) measurable qualities.
Hence this thing about I can tell it's AI because its graphical quality is bad. In a way that's correct though! The artist's ideas are hinted at in the brushstrokes (or whatever other graphical aspects). In the gen AI picture you get hints of a phony mind. It becomes hollow when you know that, or when you think you know that. It's not delivering the cultural experience, if the hints you pick up on are false.
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